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THE ADVENTURES OF ERIC BLAIR
George P. Fletcher*
THE BROTHEL BOY AND OTHER PARABLES OF THE LAW. By Norval
Morris. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 338.
$24.95.

As Eric Blair describes his job as District Officer in Moulmein in
Southern Burma in the early 1920s, he was "both policeman and magistrate, interrogator and judge, for nearly one hundred thousand Burmese, Indians, and Chinese, and a few hundred Europeans" (p. 286).
In The Brothel Boy, Norval Morris 1 writes about the legal adventures
of this fictional character with an extraordinary affection for the details of indigenous life as well as a passion to find a new way to present
the classic conundrums of the criminal law. The book crosses the local Burmese culture, as seen with English eyes, with the idiom of a
first-year University of Chicago law school class. The verisimilitude of
native culture and the integrated academic discussion are so convincing that one suspects Morris writes on the basis of his own experience,
both in Moulmein and in Chicago. I have some doubts, however,
whether the two modes of discourse - spinning tales about Eric Blair
and probing the issues of criminal responsibility - make a palatable
mix.
Morris' eight stories follow a pattern that rapidly becomes familiar. A crime occurs and Eric Blair must inquire about what to do with
the suspect. Should a young boy who has raped a local girl be subject
to capital punishment? Should a suspect who has attempted to murder his son, seemingly in response to hearing a divine command, be
treated as insane? Should another who has killed, allegedly in a somnambulist state, be treated as exempt from criminal liability? Should a
European woman, who has killed her sleeping husband after he battered her, be acquitted on grounds of self-defense? The recurring
problem in all of these stories is whether it is just to punish someone
who has caused harm in the borderland of criminal responsibility.
The pattern of resolution repeats itself. Blair confronts the problem, he begins a conversation with his Indian medical advisor Dr. Veraswami (no. apparent first name) and a local lawyer U Tin Hlang
(Lang for short), and the conversation illuminates the problems of culpability, insanity, and various defensive claims. A European woman,
• Charles Keller Beekman Professor, Columbia University School of Law. B.A. 1960, Cali·
fomia-Berkeley; J.D. 1963, M.C.L. 1965, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. Julius Kreeger Professor of Law & Criminology, University of Chicago.
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Rosemary Brett, adds her opinion, largely on matters concerning female suspects. A few other characters come and go, but the framework of interaction and discourse remains limited. We witness no
trials, and no prosecutors, no police officers, and no local political
figures or criminals harass our young hero (is this believable?). Morris
creates an idyllic world in which his imagined oracle of the law discusses fine points of legal theory with Veraswami and Hlang, flirts
with and eventually beds Rosemary, and remains in charge to report
on his inner struggles to reach just and pragmatically sound decisions.
The dramatic tension, so far as there is any, arises from the question: What will Blair do? How will he decide the case? These are not
detective stories, for there are no serious factual conundrums to be
resolved, no clues that require imaginative investigation. He has no
problem deciding which witnesses to believe and which to treat as liars. It is almost as though Eric Blair were sitting in Professor Morris'
class at Chicago and had to decide how to resolve a prepackaged set of
facts. A striking example of Morris' posing hypothetical cases to his
star student Blair is the case of the battered wife Jean Seymour, who
allegedly attacked her husband while he was asleep. By the time Blair
arrives at the scene, Veraswami has cleaned up the blood and disarray,
thus eliminating all firsthand evidence, and has devised a story about
the events leading up to the killing (pp. 261-63). After hearing the
story, Blair concludes: "The facts seemed clear enough .... Jean
Seymour had murdered her husband .... " (p. 263). Mind you, he has
not yet talked to Ms. Seymour. There are no witnesses. He is trading
exclusively on Veraswami's rather vivid imagination. In fact, we have
no reason at all to believe that old man Seymour was shot while asleep
rather than while engaged in a murderous assault against his wife.
The latter interpretation would have given Jean a clear defense of selfdefense; as it is, the omnipresent lawyer U Tin Hlang has to struggle to
generate a defense based on her fear of a recurrent attack and the local
equivalent of "learned helplessness."
All of Morris' stories are flawed by an unexpected insensitivity to
the way procedures shape the shared world of our perceptions. Apparently there are no rules of the game in Southern Burma of the
1920s. Blair talks with whomever he pleases as though his life were
one prolonged hearing of the arguments on these great matters of principle. It is much closer to reality to think about criminal law as the
product of perceptions filtered by self-interested witnesses, sometimes
sloppy police investigation, and procedures designed to protect the innocent. For a law P.rofessor, Morris is remarkably oblivious to the
factors that shape our perception of the facts underlying judgments of
criminal responsibility.
The oversimplification of factual reality robs these stories of their
dramatic tension. As soon as an issue comes into focus, the subse-
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quent debate is predictable. As the stories roll by, the reader knows
that Morris is going to be skeptical about capital punishment ("The
Brothel Boy"), sympathetic to claims of insanity ("Ake Dah") and
somnambulism ("The Planter's Dream"), troubled by the application
of the reasonable person standard to an ignorant native girl ("The Servant Girl's Baby"), bullish about necessity as a defense ("The Veraswami Story"), and inconsistent about self-defense on behalf of the
battered wife ("The Tropical Bedroom"). The only story in which
Morris succeeds in maintaining suspense has the least to do with criminal law. In "The Best Interests of the Child," Blair has to decide
whether to grant custody of a young boy to his natural Burmese
mother or to the European parents who have taken him in and treated
him as their own. The boy is torn between two worlds, and so is Blair
as he ponders whether the child will be better off with one imagined
life or another. The surprise ending enables the reader to realize how
much these predictive decisions by courts represent little more than a
roll of the dice.
Fortunately, in the criminal law, at least as it is ordinarily understood, the question is not designing the future, but coping with the
past. A crime has occurred, and we have to come to grips with the
"sunk cost" of human suffering. The assumption of criminal justice,
for good or for ill, is that punishing wrongdoers enables victims and
the rest of us to carry on with our lives. Morris seems to have little
sympathy for this common sense conception of the criminal law. Applying the law as understood by lay people is not enough. Morris and his alter ego Eric Blair - want to do good, every time.
Morris' doubts about the entire system of criminal justice become
clear in his first story "The Brothel Boy," the banner tale of the collection. A twenty-year-old boy of a seemingly deprived background
rapes a young girl, about thirteen years old, and she dies. The outraged villagers beat him up. He has no defense but Morris, speaking
through Blair, agonizes greatly about punishing him. That the punishment is hanging raises the stakes in Blair's debate with himself. He
has the impression that the boy is stupid, and Veraswami thinks that
the nameless lad is retarded but that he would be likely to rape again
(these opinions are delivered casually, without cross-examination).
Morris offers vague suggestions, not developed or explored, that the
boy acquired a perverse attitude toward sexuality by living in a
brothel. Blair thinks that punishing the rape bears some resemblance
to the flogging he received when, as a schoolboy, he wet his bed. He
concludes that "the boy was nearer to innocence than most of us" (p.
22). Again there seems to be no trial. Procedures are declared, by the
narrator's silence, to be irrelevant. The story line skips from Blair's
musings about caning in school to a description of the hanging in the
"gaol yard" (p. 23).
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Blair's (and perhaps Morris') confusions about legal and moral
guilt run through the book and culminate in a tale about Blair's potential responsibility for the newly widowed Rosemary Brett's suicide
("The Curve of Pearls"). Though Eric had apparently long since become disenchanted with Rosemary and would have liked to disengage
himself from the affair, he felt a responsibility for her after an unsuccessful suicide attempt. He accompanied her on a voyage back to
England. She was depressed. He tried to comfort her. He does his
"best, but it was not good enough. Shortly before the boat train
docked at Dover, she shot herself" (p. 326). This is the first time we
hear about her having a gun. We have no idea how she shot herself,
whether Blair was in the room at the time, or whether he possibly
could have prevented her. Nonetheless, Blair feels guilty, and apparently Morris thinks the guilt is appropriate. He sets up a denouement
of the episode in the form of an English coroner's inquest, which supposedly - with a large dose of literary license - was to consider
whether Blair was responsible for the suicide.
The suggestion that Blair could possibly be legally guilty for a suicide that he could not readily prevent strikes me as intellectually irresponsible. Perhaps Morris is interested only in the moral question.
When a friend dies, one can only feel that one might have done more
to help him or her. Despite the coroner's verdict that she killed herself
"while the balance of her mind was disturbed" (p. 333), Blair concludes his legal adventures with a sense that he had done "wrong" and
that he was being punished for her death but "not by the law" (p.
333).
Thus, Blair begins with an association between bed wetting and
rape and ends by failing to distinguish between real responsibility and
neurotic guilt. With these attitudes expressed in fairly clear cases of
criminal justice, we should not expect his reflections and manner of
proceeding to make more sense on the issues of insanity, somnambulism, negligence, necessity, or self-defense. Morris has designed the
book to provide instruction about these basic issues to undergraduates
and perhaps even to law students. Each chapter ends with a few pages
in which Morris, as teacher, in his own voice purports to instruct us
on the elementary rules we need to ponder the case at hand. Morris
provides a total of thirty-one pages and half-pages of this commentary
(pp. 24-30, 81-82, 123-27, 154-57, 206-09, 243-45, 282-85, 333-35). In
my view, he would have done better to publish the book thirty-one
pages shorter.
Morris writes fiction reasonably well, but his efforts to explain the
law fall short. Of course, it is not easy to condense the nuggets of the
criminal law into thirty-one pages, but one expects at least that the
survey would represent a fair statement of the law and the relevant
literature. The first segment (pp. 24-30) sets forth Morris' idiosyn-
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cratic views about the analysis of criminal responsibility. He tells us
that the term blame refers to the "harm done or risked - the injury"
and the term guilt "is related to the mind of the criminal, or what the
lawyers call mens rea" (p. 26). He concludes that "blame and guilt
together define the upper limit of a just punishment" (p. 26). These
are not views that I would want to see passed off on unsuspecting undergraduates or first-year law students.
This is a highly unusual way to speak of blame and guilt. Blaming,
as the term is used in English as well as in the literature, is a social
response to an allegedly criminal act. The degree of blame varies, to
be sure, with factors other than the degree of harm caused or risked.
For example, we blame intentional wrongdoing more than negligent
wrongdoing. We treat excuses, such as insanity and duress, as negating the blameworthiness of the act. We do not fairly blame those who
cannot prevent themselves from violating the law. To equate blame
with the harm done, as Morris does, is clearly to distort the language
of the courts as well as the volumes of theory written on the subject.
Morris does no better with the concept of guilt. Guilt is something
people feel about their crimes, not a variable that we use in determining criminal responsibility. "Guilty" and "not guilty" are pleas to
criminal charges, but they are not elements of those charges. No statute, so far as I know, treats the differences among intentional, reckless,
and negligent conduct as "degrees of guilt." The proper term for what
Morris has in mind is culpability or blameworthiness. The latter term
comes up in this context as well, implying the dissolution of Morris'
supposed distinction between blame and guilt. Both are aspects of the
social or communal judgment that under particular circumstances individuals can be fairly blamed for their conduct.
Morris' relentless confusion about these elementary matters comes
into bold relief when he turns to the subject of insanity. He feels
strongly that insanity should not be treated as an excuse but as a negation of the "guilt" required for conviction (p. 124). Remarkably, he
thinks there is a difference between excusing and negating culpability
or blameworthiness. He tries to clarify things in this remarkably convoluted passage (p. 124):
What the lawyers call a confession and avoidance is necessary. 2 It is
my view that there should be no special defence of insanity to a criminal
charge; the sole issue as to the accused's mind should be: did he, with a
mind that was or was not "sick," intend or willfully risk this killing?

Someone uninitiated in the deplorable confusions of Anglo-American criminal law could not possibly penetrate this passage. Allow me
to take it apart and explain what is at stake in this curious corner of
would-be theory. First, the term confession and avoidance is a term
2. Might this be a misprint in the text? The passage would read just as well if written:
"What the lawyers call confession and avoidance is unnecessary."
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used in private law, not criminal law. Though the term goes unexplained in Morris' book, we can guess what he has in mind. In private
law pleading, defendants assert some defenses as denials of elements of
the prima facie case; others concede these elements and seek to go
around them by asserting new matter. Consent in a battery case exemplifies a denial (i.e., there is no battery if there is consent); self-defense
illustrates confession and avoidance: the defendant "confesses" the
prima case of intentional battery and seeks nonetheless to "avoid" liability (i.e., the battery is justified as a matter of self-defense). These
distinctions invite the question: What kind of defense is insanity and
why does it matter?
The classification of the issue matters in allocating the burden of
persuasion. Because the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it must also disprove all elements that negate its case by
the same degree of persuasive force. On matters viewed as extrinsic to
the prosecution's case, the state is free to allocate the burden of persuasion to the defense. Morris seems to postulate that claims of insanity are a matter of confession and avoidance. In fact, most courts
have held for decades that insanity negates the culpability required for
criminal conviction and thus have routinely held that the state must
disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 Morris wants to claim
that this is the correct view, yet he does not wish, for reasons that
escape me, to recognize that an affirmative element of the state's case
is the accused's blameworthiness or moral culpability. Therefore, he
designs another, pseudo-factual component negated by a claim of insanity; and we encounter this curious language: "the sole issue as to
the accused's mind should be: did he [act] with a mind that was or
was not [insane]" (p. 124)? Morris thinks the state should have to
allege and prove that the accused acted with a "mind that was not
insane," and thus it would follow that insanity was a matter of denial
rather than confession and avoidance. He is right, but he could have
made the point much more simply. His convoluted thinking derives
from his initial confusion about guilt as a state of mind, rather than a
communal judgment of blameworthiness.
Morris thinks himself into a cul-de-sac. His rough tools of analysis
and his misconception of blame and guilt prevent him from thinking
his way through more difficult questions. Consider the familiar problem of rendering the reasonable person standard relatively more specific and attentive to the circumstances of the accused. Blair must
decide whether a local Burmese girl, who with alleged negligence mistreated her baby and allowed it to die, should be held to the standard
of a reasonable indigenous girl or to a "culturally neutral" standard.
3. See my research on this subject, done years ago, in George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds ofLegal
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J.
880 (1968).
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Morris poses the question in his commentary (p. 208) and then allows
his discussion to drift off into a consideration of religious as opposed
to cultural differences. What he fails to consider is precisely why the
indigenous culture should generate an excuse for child abuse.
It is not surprising that Morris' tools of analysis are blunt-edged.
He is not interested in mastering the problems he has set before him.
He wants to cultivate a sense of mystery, a sense of the ineffable about
guilt and innocence, about the moral and legal, about whether the
judge is better or worse than the person he or she judges. This, he
seems to think, is the stuff of literature. Maybe he is right, but there is
no need to confuse students by infusing mysteries into his efforts to
explain criminal liability.

